Firm Size Distribution and EPL in Italy by Schivardi, Fabiano & Torrini, Roberto
 
 
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
                                   
 
 
                                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm Size Distribution and EPL in Italy 
 
 
 
By: Fabiano Schivadi and Roberto Torrini 
 
William Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 613 
September 2003 
 
 Firm size distribution and EPL in Italy∗
Fabiano Schivardi - Roberto Torrini
Bank of Italy
August 2003
Abstract
We study the role of employment protection legislation (EPL) in
explaining the relative small average size of Italian ﬁrms. We con-
struct a simple model that shows that the smooth relation between
size and growth probability is disturbed in proximity of the thresholds
at which EPL applies diﬀerentially. We use a comprehensive dataset
of all Italian ﬁrms between 1986 and 1998 to estimate the eﬀects of
EPL in terms of discouraging small ﬁrms from growing. We then con-
struct a stochastic transition matrix for ﬁrm size that, together with
the estimates, allows for a quantitative evaluation of the eﬀects of EPL
in the long run. Our results show that EPL does inﬂuence ﬁrm size
distribution, but that its eﬀects are quantitatively modest: average
ﬁrm size would increase by less than 1% when removing the threshold
eﬀect. In terms of policy, these ﬁndings suggest that changes in EPL
are not likely to have a large impact on the propensity of small ﬁrms
to grow
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One of the most important peculiarities of the Italian economy compared
with most other industrialized economies is the role of small ﬁrms. For exam-
ple, according to a database of the European Commission (Eurostat 1998),
average ﬁrm size in Italy is approximately half the European average; more-
over, this is not due to the sectoral specialization of the Italian economy: in
fact, average size is consistently smaller even within fairly narrowly deﬁned
sectors, an indication that some country speciﬁcity induces a bias toward
the small size in all sectors.1
One view holds that the large presence of small ﬁrms, often agglomer-
ated in industrial districts, constitutes a strength of the Italian economy,
because of their ﬂexibility, the job creation potential and the capacity to
successfully survive competition. A less optimistic view claims that, while
the entry of small ﬁrms is a positive factor, their tendency to remain small
constitutes an important drawback because innovation and the adoption of
new technology might beneﬁt from large size. For example, Pagano & Schi-
vardi (2003) ﬁnd that, in a cross-country study, average ﬁrm size positively
aﬀects productivity growth, particularly in R&D intensive sectors. Indeed,
the peculiar Italian size structure is now often blamed as one of the reasons
for the rather disappointing growth performance over the last decade,2 well
below the European Union average.
Despite being empirically uncontroversial, the reasons for the distortion
toward small size in Italy are not well understood. Diﬀerent causes have
been proposed in the policy debate, such as the weaker enforcement of reg-
ulations and taxation for smaller ﬁrms, the lack of a legislative framework
that favors the establishment and the conduct of large, complex organiza-
tions, a form of family capitalism that prevents newcomers from displacing
incumbents. Among these explanations, particular attention has been given
to the regulation of the labor market, particularly in terms of employment
protection legislation (EPL). While the theoretical literature does not estab-
lish any uncontroversial link between EPL per se and average ﬁrm size,3 one
1See Pagano & Schivardi (2003) for size comparisons based on the database. Bartels-
man, Scarpetta & Schivardi (2003) compare ﬁrm size distribution for 9 OECD countries,
ﬁnding evidence in support of the Italian anomaly. Torrini (2002), using labor force statis-
tics, provides complementary evidence on self-employment shares, here taken as a rough
proxy for the number of ﬁrms per worker. He shows that self-employment shares in Italy
are among the highest in the OECD countries in almost every sector.
2A synthesis of this debate can be found in Traù (1999).
3Bentolilla & Bertola (1990) show that ﬁring costs reduce employment turnover, but
have only second order eﬀects (and, in their simulations, mostly positive) on average
2particular feature of EPL makes it a natural candidate as an impediment to
ﬁrm growth: EPL applies diﬀerentially to ﬁrms of diﬀerent size. In partic-
ular, the legislation that regulates dismissals imposes substantially higher
costs of ﬁring for ﬁrms above the 15 employees threshold. This implies that
crossing that threshold might impose a high potential cost on ﬁrms, which
might be discouraged from doing so, thus reducing average ﬁrm growth and
therefore average ﬁrm size.
Although this eﬀect is often called into question in the policy debate, pre-
vious studies have been unable to identify it empirically(Anastasia 1999). A
recent exception is Borgarello, Garibaldi & Pacelli (2002), who estimate the
eﬀects of the EPL on the growth probability of ﬁrms below the 15-employee
threshold, ﬁnding a signiﬁcant but quantitatively small eﬀect. In this pa-
per, we extend this research along three main lines. First, we construct a
simple model that predicts a smooth relation between a ﬁrm’s probability
of growing and its size, and show that the threshold eﬀect implies a drop
in the probability of growing in the proximity of the threshold itself; while
very stylized, the model singles out the assumptions required for identiﬁca-
tion. Second, we use a comprehensive dataset for all Italian ﬁrms between
1986 and 19 9 8t oe s t i m a t et h ee ﬀects of EPL in terms of discouraging small
ﬁrms from growing. Third, to obtain a precise measure of the impact of the
threshold eﬀect on ﬁrm size in the long-run, we construct a stochastic tran-
sition matrix for ﬁrm size and modify it according to our estimates. In this
way, we compute a notional steady state distribution of ﬁrm size that would
emerge in the absence of EPL. Our results can therefore be interpreted as
measuring the impact on the long-run ﬁrm distribution of the reduction in
small ﬁrms’ propensity to grow induced by EPL.4
Our results show that the threshold eﬀect does inﬂuence ﬁrm growth: we
ﬁnd that the growth probability in the proximity of the threshold is approx-
imately 2 percentage points lower than with no threshold eﬀect, very close
to the result obtained by Borgarello et al. (2002) with a diﬀerent empirical
approach. Once we compute its eﬀect on average ﬁrm size in steady state,
we ﬁnd it to be very modest: we estimate that, after removing the eﬀect, it
would increase by approximately 0.5 per cent, clearly a small amount; more-
over the share of ﬁrms above the 15 employees threshold would increase only
marginally from 8.66% to 8.82%. Extensions of this exercise to take into ac-
count the impact of the threshold on the behavior of all the ﬁrm size classes
employment.
4In this exercise, we take the behavior of ﬁrms above the threshold as given. In fact, as
stated above the theoretical literature has no clear cut predictions on the eﬀects of EPL
per se on size, and therefore oﬀers little guidance in identifying its eﬀects empirically.
3below 15 workers show that the overall impact on average ﬁrm size would
remain below 2%, even in the less conservative hypothesis.
In terms of policy conclusions, these ﬁndings indicate that the small
average size of Italian ﬁrms does not seem to stem mainly from EPL: in fact,
the 50% gap in average size with respect to the European partners would
remain almost intact according to our simulation exercise.5 This implies
that the roots of the Italian ﬁrm size anomaly should be sought elsewhere.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief
summary of EPL in Italy; Section 3 constructs a simple model of ﬁrm growth
that illustrates our identifying assumptions, while Section 4 estimates the
threshold eﬀects. Section 5 constructs the stochastic transition matrix and
simulates the eﬀects of EPL in the long run, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional setting
In economies where ”employment at will” does not apply,6 ﬁring costs can
be thought of as the result of three main elements: the deﬁnition of fair and
unfair dismissal; the cost of a no-fault dismissal and the penalty when the
dismissal is ruled to be unfair; the uncertainty on the result of a possible
trial. The ﬁrst deﬁnes when ﬁring is allowed; the second assesses the costs
a ﬁrm can incur; the third describes the actual enforcement of the law and
the probability of winning a case for unfair dismissal.
According to Italian employment protection legislation, individual and
collective dismissals of workers with open-end contracts are only allowed on
a just cause basis. Workers can be ﬁred because of misbehavior (giusta causa
og i u s t i ﬁcato motivo soggettivo) or due to the ﬁrms’ need to downsize or to
reorganize their activity (giustiﬁcato motivo oggettivo). A worker cannot be
ﬁred to be replaced with another if this is not justiﬁed by his misconduct
or by the need to restructure the ﬁrm’s activity. For instance, it would not
be possible to ﬁre an employee with a long tenure and a high salary just to
replace him with a young worker paid the minimum contractual wage.
Workers can appeal to the court against dismissal and are entitled to
compensation if the judge rules the dismissal was unfair that varies ac-
5This does not mean that EPL has little relevance in general, because it could impact
directly on productivity, factor reallocation and accumulation directly, above and beyond
its eﬀects through ﬁrm size (Schivardi 2000).
6S t r i c t l ys p e a k i n g ,e v e ni nt h eU S ,w h o s el e g i s l a t i o ni sc o n s i d e r e do n eo ft h el e a s t
tight among the industrialized countries, employment at will does not apply, as several
exceptions have been introduced by the courts (Autor, Donohue & Schwab 2002).
4cording to ﬁrm size.7 Since 1990, these general rules apply on an almost
universal basis, irrespective of the employers’ characteristics.8 Firing costs
are nil when a dismissal is not contested or it is ruled to be fair, although
ﬁrms may want to pay workers to make ﬁring easier (this is especially true
in collective dismissals, when lump-sum payments are sometimes explicitly
bargained with trade unions). In case of unfair dismissals, although ﬁr-
ing restrictions do not depend on the ﬁrm’s characteristics, the workers’
compensation varies substantially according to the ﬁrm size. Firms with
less than 16 employees must compensate unfairly dismissed workers with a
severance payment that varies between 2.5 and 6 months of salary (tutela
obbligatoria). As an alternative to the severance payment, ﬁrms with less
than 16 employees can opt for reinstating the worker. The potential cost of
an unfair dismissal is substantially higher in larger ﬁrms. Firms with more
than 15e m p l o y e e s , 9 to which Article 18o ft h e” Statuto dei lavoratori”10 ap-
plies, have to compensate workers for the forgone wages in the time elapsing
between the dismissal and the sentence, with no upper limits. As the trial
can last up to ﬁve years, the ﬁrm that loses a case for unfair dismissal could
be charged a fairly large amount of money. Moreover, ﬁrms are obliged to
reinstate the unfairly dismissed worker unless he or she opts for a further
compensation equal to 15 months of salary.
Given that the deﬁnition of fair dismissal is not particularly restrictive
(OECD 1999) and that the cost is nil if a dismissal is ruled to be fair, a
critical variable in determining the expected ﬁring costs in Italy is uncer-
tainty about the result of the trial. The actual application of a rule is always
diﬃcult to assess, as it depends critically on the courts and on the judges’
interpretation of the law. Some Italian jurists deem the discretionary power
7Discriminatory dismissals, such as for ethnic, religious or trade-union membership
reasons are never allowed; in this case a worker always has the right to be reinstated in
t h ew o r k - p l a c ei r r e s p e c t i v eo ft h eﬁrm size.
8In 1991 a special procedure was introduced for collective dismissals in ﬁrms with more
than 15w o r k e r s .W h e naﬁrm with more than 15 employees wants to ﬁre 5 or more workers
within 120 days to reorganize or to downsize its production, it has to follow a procedure
that involves the trade union representatives and the public administration. Firms and
unions are asked to reach an agreement on dismissals; if the administration ﬁnds that an
agreement is not possible, the ﬁrm can dismiss the workers anyway. When choosing the
workers to ﬁre, ﬁrms are required to take into account speciﬁc criteria, such as seniority
and workers’ family conditions, usually explicitly stated in collective contracts.
9More precisely, the rule refers to establishments with more than 15e m p l o y e e s ,ﬁrms
with more than 15 workers in the same municipality or with more than 60 employees.
10Law 300 of 1970, ”Statuto dei lavoratori”, was passed after the so called ”hot autumn”
of 1969, when large-scale strikes were called all over the country, forcing Parliament and
the government to pass pro-labor reforms.
5of judges to be very large (Ichino 1996), so that ﬁrms undergoing a trial for
unfair dismissal would not be sure of the result of the case even when the
dismissal is justiﬁed by the ﬁrm’s need or when it is justiﬁed by the worker’s
behavior. In fact, the ﬁrm bears the burden of proof. In principle, however,
the judges’ discretionary power should be less when the dismissal is due to
the need to reduce the workforce or reorganize the production process. In
this case judges should refrain from evaluating the ﬁrm’s strategy and should
only make sure that the reasons a ﬁrm gives for ﬁring a worker are genuine.
Moreover, in the case of collective dismissals, the uncertainty should not be
very great as ﬁrms and unions bargain on dismissals and the public admin-
istration is directly involved. On the contrary, when the dismissal is due
to worker misconduct, the judge is asked to assess the eﬀective behavior of
the worker. In this case it could prove diﬃcult for a ﬁrm to show a worker
deserves to be ﬁred. This kind of uncertainty, however, does not seem to be
a peculiar characteristic of Italian regulations. Whenever the decision to ﬁre
a worker is subject to the judgment of a court, there is some scope for dif-
ferent interpretations of the same facts over time or across diﬀerent courts.
For large Italian ﬁrms, however, this uncertainty can be very important in
making their decisions, as the compensation in case of unfair dismissal has
no upper limit and depends on the duration of the trial, which can be very
long. Ichino (1996) argues that the uncertainty about the result of the case,
together with the potential high cost in case of loss, is a strong deterrent to
initiating a dismissal procedure even when the ﬁrm might think it has the
r i g h tt od os o . 11 Thus, the expected ﬁring cost would be substantially higher
for ﬁrms with more than 15w o r k e r s ,t ow h i c hA r t i c l e18o ft h eStatuto dei
lavoratori applies.12
As to the relevance of the ﬁring legislation, the scanty international ev-
idence shows that the number of cases relating to the termination of an
employment contract brought before the tribunals is lower in Italy than in
most European countries (Bertola, Boeri & Cases 2000), but in Italy more
11During the early 1990s’ severe recession, however, big ﬁrms were able to shed a large
number of workers, while the share of cases for unfair dismissals won by workers recorded a
substantial drop. This seems to show that, at least at that time, the judges’ interpretation
of the Italian employment protection legislation did not prevent ﬁrms restructuring.
12The threshold of 15 workers is also relevant for the establishment of the ”Rappre-
sentanze Sindacali Aziendali”. Workers of ﬁrms with more than 15 employees can elect
trade union representatives at ﬁrm level, who can call general meetings, aﬃx posters on
union activity and call referendums. This, however, should not be of major relevance, as
trade union membership and activity within the ﬁrm do not depend on the presence of
a ”Rappresentanza Sindacale Aziendale”. Moreover, collective agreements apply also to
workers and ﬁrms that do not belong to unions and employers’ organizations.
6than half of these cases are won by the workers. This piece of evidence is
diﬃcult to interpret, as expectations about the result of a trial can aﬀect
the decision to go to court for both workers and ﬁrms, causing a severe se-
lection bias. Thus, one can argue neither that ﬁring legislation is irrelevant
due to the limited number of cases decided by the tribunals, nor that judges
are more favorable to workers due to the higher frequency of cases won by
workers. The ﬁrst could be due to the fact that ﬁrms refrain from ﬁring
owing to their fear of adverse decisions, the second could depend on the fact
that workers take a case to court only when they have a high probability of
winning it.
3 A simple model of threshold eﬀects and size
structure
The study of the determinants of the size distribution of ﬁrms has a long
tradition in economics. Classical theories of size structure concentrated on
technical factors, stressing returns to scale and eﬃcient scale of operation
as the fundamental determinants of size (Viner 1932). These theories had
no role for either heterogeneity or dynamics because the optimal size is
unique. Overwhelming empirical evidence both of a persistent dispersion in
the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrm size in an industry and of a certain
stability in the stochastic pattern of evolution of ﬁrm size (Gibrat’s law of
independent increments) has challenged this view and prompted the formu-
lation of theories to account for such regularities. Modern theories of size
distribution assume that ﬁrms are heterogeneous along some dimension –
typically, eﬃciency – that has a direct impact on their equilibrium size.13
13In Lucas (1978), the size of a ﬁrm is determined by the ability of the entrepreneur,
with more able entrepreneurs optimally choosing a larger scale of operation and with
entrepreneurial ability distributed randomly in the population. He shows that if the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labor is less than one, average size is positively
correlated with the level of development (i.e. per-capita capital) of the economy. Jo-
vanovic (1982) builds a model in which the optimal size of the ﬁrm is determined by
a productivity parameter drawn upon entering and unknown to the ﬁrm, which learns
about it during its life cycle. The model delivers a series of predictions in line with em-
pirical evidence both on the evolution of ﬁrm size at the individual level and on the size
distribution. Hopenhayn (1992) considers a similar model in which the productivity pa-
rameter is known, but evolves as a random process over time. He relates the exogenous
characteristics of the industry, such as the entry cost, total demand and the stochastic
process for the productivity parameter to the steady-state distribution of ﬁrms and to the
p r o c e s so fe n t r ya n de x i t .E r i c s o n&P a k e s( 1995), Pakes & McGuire (1994) endogenize
the productivity parameter, assuming that its evolution is (stochastically) determined by
7In this view, the equilibrium size structure will depend not only on tech-
nological factors but also on institutional characteristics such as regulation
in product and labor markets, taxation, development of the ﬁnancial sec-
tor, size of the market. In particular, labor market institutions such as EPL
could inﬂuence both the growth pattern at the ﬁrm level and the equilibrium
size distribution.
The previous consideration suggests a possible empirical strategy to test
the eﬀects of EPL on ﬁrm size: one could simply correlate country-level
indicators of ﬁrm size on indicators of stringency of the legislation. This is a
rather problematic avenue to follow. First, theory oﬀers very little guidance
in determining the eﬀects of EPL itself (i.e. independently of threshold
eﬀects) on ﬁrm size, making identiﬁcation diﬃcult. Second, countries diﬀer
along diﬀerent dimensions, many of which are likely to inﬂuence ﬁrm size14
and are usually very correlated: in fact, multivariate regressions of this
sort tend to be rather unstable. Third, the determination of the stringency
of EPL legislation across countries is a diﬃcult and questionable exercise.
The most inﬂuential comparative study is that conducted by the OECD,
which collects detailed information on individual and collective dismissals
f o rm o s tm e m b e rc o u n t r i e s( O E C D1999). The OECD study evaluates (i)
how restrictive is the deﬁnition of fair dismissal; (ii) how cumbersome are
the procedures for ﬁring workers and (iii) the cost of ﬁring a worker, both in
the case of a no-fault dismissal and of an unfair one. It explicitly skips the
diﬃculty of assessing the actual application of the rules by courts, arguably
a very important component of the total cost of EPL, limiting the analysis
t ot h ec o m p a r i s o no fl e g i s l a t i o n s .E v e ns o ,i ti sv e r yh a r dt oc o m eu pw i t h
reliable statistics. In particular, for the Italian case, the TFR (trattamento di
ﬁne rapporto, a deferred compensation paid to the worker upon separation,
irrespective of the reason) is wrongly classiﬁed as a ﬁring cost. This results
in an overestimation of the index of rigidity for Italy: in fact, excluding
the TFR, the position of Italy in the ranking of the index of stringency of
individual dismissal legislation goes from the 5th to the 18th(see Appendix
A.1 for more details).
In this paper we follow a diﬀerent route from the cross-country compar-
isons. We use the fact that EPL in Italy applies diﬀerentially to ﬁrms of
the investment choices of the ﬁrms, and study the interaction of ﬁrms in determining the
stochastic distribution of ﬁrm size, the evolution of the industry and of the ﬁrm at the
individual level.
14Kumar, Rajan & Zingales (2001) carry out a cross-country analysis of the determinants
of ﬁrm size, considering factors such as the size of the market, per capita income and
judicial eﬃciency. They do not consider EPL among their country characteristics.
8diﬀerent sizes, which delivers clear-cut implications for both ﬁrm size dis-
tribution and the pattern of ﬁr mg r o w t h . W em a k et h i sp o i n tu s i n ga n
extremely stylized, partial equilibrium model of ﬁrm size distribution based
on an exogenous determinant of individual size.
Firms produce output with a decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas
technology with labor as the only input, and with a productivity or demand
shock that determines the marginal product of labor:
Y = Alα (1)
For given wage w, optimal employment is
l∗ =( α
A
w
)
1
1−α (2)
In this economy, the size structure at any point in time is determined by
the distribution of A, and its evolution by the stochastic evolution of A.W e
assume that A = eε and, following the literature on Gibrat’s law, that ε
evolves according to a random walk:15
εt = εt−1 + ut (3)
where u is and iid random variable drawn from a density function f with
E(u)=0 ,V(u)=σ2; we assume that the likelihood of a shock is inversely
related to its absolute values (f reaches a maximum at zero and declines
as we move away from it). This formulation can accommodate two features
that have appealing implications for ﬁrm size dynamics:
1. Firm productivity is highly persistent;
2. Shocks are proportional to the level of productivity:
∆logA = ut. (4)
The ﬁrst feature reproduces the empirical regularity that ﬁrm size growth
i sar e g u l a rp r o c e s sr a t h e rt h a na ne r r a t i co n e ;t h es e c o n dr e ﬂects the fact
that absolute changes in employment depend on initial size.
Assume now that, due to indivisibility of labor or to any form of ad-
justment costs, a ﬁrm changes employment only when the shock is above or
15Our results generalize to the case that ε is an AR(1) process, as long as the autore-
gressive coeﬃcient is suﬃciently close to 1.
9below a certain threshold x, and remains inactive otherwise:16
adjust ⇐⇒ |At+1 − At| >x
Using the deﬁnition of A and the autoregressive structure of ε,w ec a nr e -
formulate the probability of inaction as:
Pr{lt+1 = lt} =P r {|At+1 − At| <x } =
=P r {|eut+1 − 1| <
x
eεt} (5)
Using a ﬁrst order approximation, (5) simpliﬁes to:
Pr{lt+1 = lt} =P r {−
x
eεt <u t+1 <
x
eεt} = F(
x
eεt) − F(−
x
eεt) (6)
Using the fact that, by inverting (2), eε = l1−α w
α,w eo b t a i n
Pr{lt+1 = lt} =P r {−
x
l1−α
t
w
α
<u t+1 <
x
l1−α
t
w
α
} (7)
Equation (7) states that the probability of inaction declines smoothly with
ﬁrm size: in fact, the larger lt, the smaller the interval in which inaction
is the preferred choice. This result is due to the fact that the adjustment
cost is assumed to be independent of ﬁrm size, while the size of the shocks
is proportional to it.
To model the eﬀects of EPL, the fundamental observation is that the leg-
islation applies diﬀerentially to ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. Although the rules
deﬁning a fair dismissal do not diﬀer according to the employer’s charac-
teristics, the consequences of an unfair dismissal critically depend on ﬁrm
size. The ”Articolo 18” of EPL imposes a higher expected cost of ﬁring
for ﬁrms above the 15-employee threshold, as the compensation depends on
the length of the trial and workers can ask for reinstatement. A full mod-
e l i z a t i o no ft h eﬁring cost is well beyond the scope of this paper; however,
as shown by Bentolilla & Bertola (1990), ﬁring costs can be thought of as
increasing the expected cost of labor because the ﬁrm takes into account the
expected costs of ﬁring. We therefore assume that ﬁrms above the relevant
employment threshold ˜ l pay a wage wH = λw,w i t hλ > 1.17
16We are assuming that the cost x is independent of size, an assumption that is reason-
able because we are considering an absolute level of employment changes. In practice, this
requires that the cost of hiring one additional worker to be similar across ﬁrms of diﬀerent
size. The results below can be reached even with less restrictive assumptions, as long as
the cost does not increase proportionally with size, a clearly unrealistic hypothesis.
17Another possibility is to assume that ﬁrms that pass the threshold pay an additional
ﬁxed cost c. This assumption is less realistic and, in any case, leads to very similar
predictions.
10Deﬁne Π(A) as the maximized value of proﬁts for a ﬁrm with produc-
tivity level A. It is immediately evident that
Π(A)=(
1 − α
α
)(
αA
wα)
1
1−α. (8)
Clearly, Π (A) > 0: the higher the productivity level, the higher the value
of the proﬁts. The problem of the ﬁrm in the presence of a threshold above
which EPL imposes additional costs can be formulated as follows:
max
l
{Alα − [wI{l≤˜ l} + λw(1 − I{l≤˜ l})]l} (9)
where I{l≤˜ l} is the indicator function taking the value of 1 if l ≤ ˜ l and zero
otherwise. The problem is non diﬀerentiable at ˜ l.D e ﬁne ˜ A = w˜ l1−α
α as the
productivity level at which optimal employment is right at the threshold.
Clearly, optimal employment will be equal to (αA
w )
1
1−α for A ≤ ˜ A.W h e n
the productivity shock passes this threshold, we need to compare the proﬁts
at the threshold employment level, which on condition the threshold is not
passed, maximizes proﬁts, and those at the optimized value of employment
given wH :
A˜ lα − w˜ l ≶ (
1 − α
α
)(
αA
(λw)α)
1
1−α. (10)
By construction, evaluated at ˜ A, the left-hand side of (10) is larger than the
right-hand side; moreover, the former increases linearly with A,w h i l et h e
latter does so exponentially. This implies that there exist one and only one
¯ A at which (10) is satisﬁed as an equality, and above which it is optimal
to pass the employment threshold. It is immediately evident that the size
o ft h er e g i o ni nw h i c h˜ l is the preferred employment level increases the λ,
i.e. the higher the diﬀerential cost implied by the EPL. We can therefore
characterize optimal employment as follows:
l∗ =

 
 
(αA
w )
1
1−α
˜ l
(αA
λw)
1
1−α
if A< ˜ A
if ˜ A ≤ A< ¯ A
if A ≥ ¯ A
As long as the costs of EPL are suﬃciently high, i.e. ¯ A suﬃciently
higher than ˜ A, the optimal employment policy in the presence of EPL has
important consequences for the probability of growth:
Pr{lt+1 > ˜ l| ˜ A} =P r {At+1 ≥ ¯ A| ˜ A} < Pr{At+1 ≥ ˜ A + x| ˜ A} (11)
11if and only if ¯ A> ˜ A+x, where we use the notation Pr{At+1|z} ≡ Pr{At+1|At =
z} The inequality in (11) formalizes the identifying assumption that we will
use in the empirical work: EPL makes employment growth less attractive
for ﬁrms in the proximity of the threshold. This implies that, with respect
to a situation without the diﬀerential eﬀect of the EPL, we should observe:
1. An increase in the share of ﬁrms in the proximity of the threshold;
2. A drop in the growth probability for ﬁrms at the threshold.
These predictions, coupled with the smoothness of the employment level-
probability of inaction relation implied by (7), oﬀer an identiﬁcation strategy
to estimate the impact of EPL on the growth choices of ﬁrms below the
threshold: if we observe that the probability of growing follows a smooth
pattern, broken in the proximity of the threshold, than we can speculate
that the deviation from this smooth relation is attributable to the eﬀects of
EPL.
4 Estimating the threshold eﬀect
We use data on ﬁrms collected in the period 1986-1998 by the Social Secu-
rity Administration (Inps),18 which covers the entire population of private
ﬁrms with at least one employee (about 1.1 million ﬁrms per year). We use
information collected in January of each year so that the size of each ﬁrm
is deﬁned as the stock of employees registered in the Inps’ archive in this
month.19 Figure 1 reports the share of ﬁrms and of employment by size
class for the whole economy in the entire sample period 1986-98. The main
features of the pictures are by now well known:20
18A comprehensive description of Inps’archives can be found in Contini (2002).
19The employment concept of the ”Statuto dei lavoratori” relevant to determine the 15-
employee threshold excludes workers with an apprenticeship contract; moreover, case-law
allows ﬁrms to weight part time workers according to the hours actually worked and refers
to the usual employment level. While this will introduce some noise in our estimates it
does not seem to be very relevant. In fact, Borgarello et al. (2002) using a richer data
set for the province of Turin, that accounts for such factors, do not ﬁnd major diﬀerences
comparing the inaction probability of ﬁrms around the threshold computed according to
two diﬀerent concepts of employment, the ﬁrst identical to the one we use, the other more
similar to the one the law refers to.
20The analysis is conducted on the whole private sector. Manufacturing and services
repeat the same patterns, with the distribution shifted to the right for the ﬁrst and to the
left for the second, arguably due to technological factors.
12• Small ﬁrms constitute the vast majority of the population: more than
75% of them have less than 5 employees, and only 0.3% more than
250.
• The picture is dramatically diﬀerent in terms of employment: ﬁrms
with less than 5 employees account for around 15% of employment,
while those with at least 250 employees for 35%.
The density function of Italian ﬁrms declines smoothly with the ﬁrm
size. To get a closer picture of the distribution in the neighborhood of the
threshold, Figure 2 reports the annual average number of ﬁrms by ﬁrm size
in the 8-25 employment interval. Similarly to Istat (2002), which uses data
on 1999 from the Statistical Archive on Active Firms,21 the number of ﬁrms
regularly declines until 12-13 employees; it still declines, but at a slower
pace, at 14a n d15, and drops at 16, after which the number of ﬁrms starts
to decrease again at a regular pace. This weak disturbance in the relation
between the number of ﬁrms and their size is a sign that some threshold
eﬀect is probably at work, even if its impact on the size distribution appears
to be limited.
We turn to the predictions of the model in terms of growth probability.
For each employment level we compute this probability as the share of ﬁrms
that increase the number of employees from one year to the next. Figure
3 plots this probability against size in the range from 5 to 25 employees;
the relation between the probability of growth and size is a reasonably regu-
larly increasing one, as predicted by the model. Moreover, a clear downward
spike emerges at 14-15 employees, just at the threshold we suspect inﬂuences
ﬁrm size dynamics. Similar patterns are observed separately analyzing ser-
vices and manufacturing, the main diﬀerence being that smaller ﬁrms in the
service sector have a smaller probability of growing (Figure 4).22
To quantify this eﬀect, we estimate a probit model where the probability
of growing is assumed to be a function of the size of the ﬁr ma n do fas e t
of control variables (age, sector, region and time eﬀects). We include in the
21This archive, organized by the Italian Statistical Institute is the most reliable source
on the universe of Italian ﬁrms.
22We have also checked that this probability is stable over time. The share of ﬁrms that
increase employment from one year to the next for four size classes around the 15 threshold
(5-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25) shows a clear cyclical pattern and a slightly negative trend.
This, however, seems to mirror the diﬀerences in macroeconomic conditions between the
ﬁrst and second half of the period rather than a structural change in the ﬁrm size dynamics.
Moreover, the four groups of ﬁrms share the same tendencies, so that it seems fair to say
that the probability of growing net of cyclical factors has remained quite stable in the size
r a n g ew ec o n s i d e r .
13regression three dummies for ﬁrms with 13, 14a n d15 employees respectively,
which should capture the threshold eﬀect due to employment protection
legislation. Given the apparent non-linearity between growth probability
and ﬁrm size, we have taken a four-degree polynomial in size, while age
was introduced in the standard quadratic form. Our results are robust to
alternative speciﬁcation. 23
Table 1 reports the results of the estimates and Figure 5 plots the average
probability of growth and the average of the predicted values of our model
by size. As the ﬁgure shows, the model ﬁts the actual probabilities quite
well, and the dummy at size 15 is approximately -1.5% and signiﬁcant, while
at 14 it already drops to -.35%, and it is not statistically diﬀerent from zero
at 13. These values are similar to those obtained by Borgarello et al. (2002)
using yearly averages instead of micro data, and therefore not controlling
for age, sector and location.
We run several robustness checks. We have repeated this exercise for
the service and manufacturing sectors in order to assess whether the appar-
ently diﬀerent relation between probability and size we saw above has any
signiﬁcant impact in the estimate of the threshold eﬀect. Table 1,c o l u m n2 ,
reports the estimates and Figure 6 plots actual and predicted probabilities
for manufacturing, while column 3 and Figure 7 do so for services. Once we
split the sample, the threshold eﬀect seems to be slightly higher (-1.78 in
manufacturing and -1.76 in the service sector).24
Given that we consider the probability of growth, irrespective of its mag-
nitude, the dummy at 14, which turns out to be signiﬁcant, is harder to
interpret, as a ﬁrm at 14 could still grow by 1 employee without passing
the threshold. The fact that we observe a signiﬁcant eﬀect at 14c o u l dt h u s
depend on our measure of ﬁrm size, which does not necessarily coincide with
that relevant for the application of the employment protection legislation,
producing some noise in the identiﬁcation of the ﬁrms potentially aﬀected
by the threshold. Instead we should expect the reduction in the probability
of growing that we ﬁnd at 15a l s ot ob ep r e s e n tf o rl o w e re m p l o y m e n tl e v e l s
for size increases that imply crossing the threshold. In fact, equation (11)
can be generalized to any employment level below the threshold:
Pr{lt+1 > ˜ l|At ≤ ˜ A} =P r {At+1 ≥ ¯ A|At} < Pr{At+1 ≥ ˜ A + x|At}
23Our results do not change substantially if we include dummies for ﬁrms whose size
is just above the threshold or extend the sample to ﬁr m sw i t hl e s st h a n5o ra b o v e2 5
employees, or restrict ourselves to ﬁrms belonging to speciﬁc age groups.
24Note this two sectors are not exhaustive, as constructions and mining are not therein.
14if and only if ¯ A> ˜ A+x. To visualize this eﬀect, Figure 8 reports in each sub-
panel the probability of growing by 1 or more, 2 or more and so on. The
eﬀect is very apparent for employment levels not far from the threshold,
while it tends to disappear as we move away from it. This is due to the
fact that the probability of experiencing a shock that prompts a suﬃciently
large size increase to cross the threshold decreases as we move away from the
threshold itself: in fact, the smooth expansion pattern implied by Gibrat’s
law makes large increases less likely. The same pattern is observed looking
at the probability of growing by exactly 1,2 ,3e t c . ,r e p o r t e di nF i g u r e9 .
Table 2 reports the estimates of the dummy 15 for the probability to
grow by one or more, of the dummy 14 for the probability of growing by
two or more, of the dummy 13 for that of growing by 3 or more and so
forth, obtained by probit models separately estimated for each size increase
probability. We used a fourth-degree polynomial in size for rows 1 and 2,
a third-degree polynomial for row 3 and a second-degree polynomial in size
in the other probits to accommodate the diﬀerent relations between these
probabilities and size, which is apparent from Fig. 8. As can be seen, the
impact of the threshold moving away from 15 rapidly becomes very low: we
estimate that for a ﬁrm with 12 workers the threshold prompts a reduction
in the probability of growing by 4 or more of 0.36 percentage points; for a
ﬁrm of 10 a reduction of the probability of growing by 6 or more equal to 0.1
percentage points and for a size increase of 8 workers or more a reduction
of only 0.06 percentage points for ﬁrms with 8 workers. The eﬀects are
negligible afterward.
4.1 Extensions
It has been argued (Ichino, Polo & Rettore 2001) that local labor market
conditions could aﬀect courts’ decisions, in that in a tighter labor market,
judges would be more inclined to allow a dismissal than when the unem-
ployment rate is high and the possibility of ﬁn d i n gan e wj o bl o w . I c h i n o
et al. (2001)s e e mt oﬁnd some supporting evidence for their argument by
analyzing the personnel data of a large bank with branches spread all over
the country.25 According to this hypothesis, the actual application of EPL
and the cost of trespassing the 15-employee threshold should diﬀer according
to the local labor market conditions. As in the South the unemployment
rate is much higher than in the North (in 1993, ﬁrst year of the new la-
25This evidence, even if based on a single case study and only relying on dismissals due
to workers’ behavior, has by now become a sort of stylized fact relating to the Italian labor
m a r k e t ,a n di ti so f t e nq u o t e di ni n t e r n a t i o n a lr e p o r t s .
15bor force survey, it was about 17 per cent in the South and 6 per cent in
the North), we should observe a stricter application of EPL and therefore a
greater incentive to remain under the threshold in southern regions. We can
test this hypothesis by repeating our exercise and computing the threshold
eﬀect by area. In columns 4 to 7 of Table 1 we report the estimates by
area. Our evidence does not support the hypothesis. Contrary to what one
would expect, the eﬀe c ts e e mt ob ew e a k e ri nt h eS o u t ht h a ne l s e w h e r e . ( 0 . 9
percentage points, against 2.4 in the Center, 2.0 in the North West and 1.5
in the North East).26.
Saint-Paul (2002) claims that EPL should be more relevant for ﬁrms in
innovative sectors, as they would face a more uncertain environment and
therefore would require a higher workers’ turnover rate. To test this as-
sumption, we have repeated our basic exercise for two broad manufacturing
sectors that should diﬀer as to the incidence of innovative activities: the Tra-
ditional products sector (Textile, leather and wood) and the Machinery and
equipment sector. The estimate of the threshold eﬀe c ti ss o m e w h a tl a r g e r
for the machinery sector, as predicted by the theory (1.6 vis-a-vis 1.2), but
the diﬀerence between the two sectors is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Labor laws introduce multiple thresholds relevant for diﬀerent aspects
of the employment relation (Baﬃ &B a ﬃ1 999). To check for the presence
of other signiﬁcant thresholds, Figure 10 reports the inaction probability by
ﬁrm size in the range from 5 to 55 workers; in addition to the one at 15,
another clear hump appears at 35. In fact, above 35 employees ﬁrms were
requested, until the reform of 1999,27 to hire 15 per cent of their workers
from the list of the so called ”protected categories”, namely disabled people,
refugees, orphans and widows of persons who died in war or in the workplace.
This rule substantially restricted ﬁrms’ freedom to choose their employees.
To assess its impact quantitatively we run the same speciﬁcation as before,
with two dummies for ﬁrms with 34 and 35 employees. Even if the relation
26The hypothesis that a high unemployment rate is associated with less strict application
of EPL is not supported by time series analysis either. In fact, considering litigations from
1975 to 1999 we observe that the rate of success of workers is lower in the mid 1990s,
when the number of judgments was very large due to the early 1990s, recession and the
unemployment rate was very high as well.
27The reform of March 1999 changed the rule in the following way: ﬁrms with a number
of workers between 15 and 35 have to hire a worker from the protected categories; ﬁrms
with 35 to 50 employees have to hire two workers; and ﬁrms above 50 employees have to
hire 7 per cent of their workforce from these categories. This has made the 35-employee
threshold less relevant, by decreasing the share of ”protected” workers and by spreading
it more evenly across ﬁrms of diﬀerent sizes. The recent changes in the rules do not aﬀect
our sample, as it includes data from 1986 to 1998.
16between the probability of growing and size is not as smooth as in the
range from 5 to 25, the relation is stable enough to single out a drop in
the probability just around the threshold 3: the probability of growing is
reduced between 1 and 2%, again in this case a signiﬁcant but rather limited
amount.
5E P L a n d ﬁrm size in steady-state
We have seen that the threshold eﬀects of EPL are quite evident, even if
their magnitude seems rather small. However, we lack a precise measure
of their real impact: in fact, it could be that an apparently small eﬀect on
the year-to-year probability of growing is compounded in the long run and
has a sizable impact on the steady-state distribution. To assess the long-
run consequences of EPL on the size distribution, we use a representation
of ﬁrms dynamics based on a stochastic transition matrix (STM). An STM
is a matrix P whose entries pi,j represent the probability of a ﬁrm moving
from size class j to size class i from one year to the next, for any size class
subdivision. Given that we have the ﬁrm population, we can calculate the
exact probabilities of transition for any size class subdivision. This can be
seen as a non-parametric representation of the transition probability of ﬁrm
size that exploits the Markov property of the productivity shocks assumed
in (3). Deﬁne Xt as the n-dimensional vector {xt
1,...,xt
n+1}, where xt
i is the
share of ﬁrms in size class i and n+1 represents exit.28 Then, the evolution
of X is governed by the system of diﬀerence equations
Xt+1 = PXt (12)
We show in Appendix A.2 that, using the theory of Markov chains (see, for
example, Karlin & Taylor 1975), under regularity conditions each STM is
associated with a unique steady state distribution, irrespective of any initial
distribution X0; the long-run distribution is obtained by solving the system
of equations X = PX, in addition to the condition Σjxj = 1. Our strategy
is to calculate the steady state distribution associated with the actual STM
and to modify the STM by removing the threshold eﬀects according to the
28To accommodate entry and exit we use the following convention: the last row of the
matrix represents exit and the last column entry; x
t
n+1 is the share of entrants between
the beginning and the end of period t,s ot h a tpn+1,ix
t
n+1 is the contribution of entry to
x
t+1
i ; x
t+1
n+1 =
 
j pn+1,jx
t
j is the share of exit between t and t+1.T h i si m p l i e st h a tx
t
n+1
represents exits during the previous period at the beginning of the period and entry during
the current period at the end of it. This convention agrees perfectly with the steady-state,
where entry and exit are necessarily the same.
17ﬁndings of the previous section; the corresponding steady state distribution
can then be interpreted as the one that would prevail in the absence of
the threshold eﬀect, thus obtaining a well-deﬁned measure of the long-run
impact of EPL on ﬁrm size.
Table 4 reports the STM, constructed as an average of the yearly ma-
trices for the period 1986-98 to minimize the possibility that business cycle
factors inﬂuence the long-run behavior. A preliminary inspection of the
matrix revels that the assumptions of the model are in line with the data.
The persistence of the size at the individual level clearly emerges from the
diagonal, whose entries are always the largest in the column. Moreover, the
matrix conﬁrms that ﬁrm size tends to evolve smoothly: in fact, entries in
the cells adjacent to the diagonal are always larger than those farther away
from it, indicating that big jumps are less likely than small ones. Entry
occurs mostly at the small end of the size distribution, and the probability
of death decreases with ﬁrm size.
One potential problem with this approach is that the actual size dis-
tribution might be very diﬀerent from the steady state one. In this case,
projecting ahead the evolution of the size distribution might be a dangerous
exercise, because any temporary trend might be inﬂated in steady-state.29
Table 5 reports the actual distribution (calculated as the average over the
period 1986-98) and the steady-state distribution. The table shows that the
movements in the size distribution seem to imply a slightly larger share of
ﬁrms in the intermediate classes, with a very small decrease of the share
of those in the largest class. The last column reports the average size
within class µj;30 we can compute the implied average steady state size
as µss =
 
j xss
j µj. In turns out that the increase in the share of ﬁrms in
the intermediate size classes more than compensate for the decrease in the
largest: in fact, the steady state mean size is 9.24, compared with 9.0 for
the actual size. The increase is small, however indicating that for the period
29Indeed, we ﬁnd that changes in average size over the period 1986-98 are very small,
ranging from 9.1 in 19 8 6t o8 . 8i n1998, a reduction of approximately 3%. Comparing the
employment and ﬁrm shares for the ﬁrst and the last year of our sample, i.e. 1986 and
1998, there is no clear shift in the distribution. However, an interesting pattern emerges:
there is evidence that the tails are becoming thinner and the center of the distribution
fatter. This is more apparent from the employment share picture, which shows clearly
that employment from 1986 to 1998 decreased by approximately 4% in the class 250+ and
increased by approximately the same amount in the size class 16-249.
30It is reasonable to assume that the average size within class µi is ﬁxed. This is an ob-
vious identity for size classes deﬁned only on one employment level. It is also a reasonable
assumption in this context, where we look at changes in the distribution between classes
and not within them.
181986-98 there seems to be no important trend in ﬁrm size distribution.
Having checked the reliability of the steady-state analysis, we now pro-
ceed to compute the long-run eﬀect of the threshold. Our ﬁrst experiment
restricts the threshold eﬀect to inﬂuencing only the growth probability of
ﬁrms in the proximity of the threshold itself. Our probit estimates show that
the threshold eﬀect reduces the probability of growing by approximately 2
percentage points for ﬁrms in the 9th size class, which corresponds to the
13-15 employment interval. We therefore reduce the persistence probability
for that class by reducing the entry in the diagonal; correspondingly, we in-
crease the probability of growing using two diﬀerent assumptions about the
way ﬁrms would grow in the absence of the threshold: ﬁrst, we redistribute
the probability to the size class just above the threshold; second, we redis-
tribute it to all size classes above the threshold, in proportion to the actual
probability of moving to each class (excluding the exit class).31 Formally, if
the reduction in the persistence probability is δ,t h e nw em o d i f yt h ee n t r i e s
in the matrix as follows:
˜ p9,9 = p9,9 − δ (13)
˜ p10,9 = p10,9 + δ (14)
˜ pi,9 = pi,9 + δ
pi,9  n
l=10 pl,9
,i = 10,..,n (15)
where a tilde indicates values that would prevail in the absence of EPL
and (14) and (15) formalize the two redistribution assumptions. We then
compute a new steady state distribution ˜ X and, using the within-class av-
erage size, the average size that would prevail in the absence of the EPL:
˜ µ =
 n
ι=1 ˜ xiµi. We also compute the change in the share of ﬁrms above 15
employees.
Table 6 reports the results of these experiments. The ﬁrst column re-
ports the size classes modiﬁed in the experiment; the second, the size of the
probability moved from cell (9,i) (the probability of moving the ninth size
class, just below the threshold) to those above; the last 4 columns report the
change in average size and in the share of ﬁrms above 15 for the two redistri-
bution methods. The ﬁrst line reports the results of the basic experiments,
in which only the 13-15 size class is modiﬁed. We ﬁnd that an increase of
2 percentage points in the growth probability of ﬁrms in this size class (an
31The ﬁr s tr e d i s t r i b u t i o na s s u m p t i o ni sm o r ei nl i n ew i t ht h em o d e l ,a si ta s s u m e st h a t
ﬁrms that do not grow are those that have received shocks not large enough to make it
worthwhile to cross the threshold. The second can be seen as a robustness check.
19overestimate, given that we are also attributing the larger decrease of ﬁrms
with 15e m p l o y e e st oﬁrms with 14a n d13 employees) would bring about
an increase of 0.5% in the average ﬁrm size (from 9.24 to 9.28) using the
ﬁrst redistribution assumption (equation 14 )a n do f0 . 7 %u s i n gt h es e c o n d
(equation 15). Moreover, the share of ﬁrms above the 15 threshold increases
b ys m a l la m o u n t s ,a l w a y sw e l lb e l o w1%. These are clearly small eﬀects, in
particular in the light of the ”Italian anomaly”, i.e. that ﬁrm size in Italy
is approximately half that of the European Union.
A ﬁrst possible explanation of such low eﬀe c t si st h a tw eh a v eo n l y
considered the size class just below the threshold, while in the previous
section we have seen that in the other classes too there is a clear decline in
the probability of growing above the threshold. We therefore also modify the
probability for the previous size classes according to the estimate reported in
Table 2. The next two lines report the results when we modify, in addition
to the 9th, the entries in columns 8 and 7 (corresponding to the 10-12a n d8 - 9
size classes). We ﬁnd that the eﬀects are only marginally greater, increasing
average ﬁrm size by 0.65 and 1.2 per cent for the two redistribution methods
respectively.
We have seen that estimating the reduction in the probability of growth
for the size classes further away from the threshold is rather problematic. As
an alternative approach to determining such probabilities we assume that
the increase in the probability of moving to the size class just below the
threshold, p9,j for j = 1,2,...,8 is proportional to that estimated for the size
class 9: formally,
δj = δ
p9,j
p9,9
,j= 1,2,...8 (16)
so that
˜ p9,j = p9,j − δj (17)
˜ p10,j = p10,j + δj (18)
˜ pi,j = pi,j + δj
pi,j  n
l=10 pl,j
,i = 10,..,n (19)
Results are reported in lines 4-9 of Table 6. The second column reports the
size of the probability reallocation calculated according to equation (16).
The probability reallocation is slightly higher than estimated, and so is the
increase in the average size. However, as we add in more classes away from
the threshold the additional eﬀect becomes increasingly smaller, because
the probability of moving just below the threshold becomes smaller and
20smaller. In practice, most of the change is accounted for by the classes
with 8 employees and over. When all classes are included, the average ﬁrm
size increase is 0.86% in the ﬁrst reallocation method and 1.8 in the second.
This analysis therefore suggests that most of the eﬀe c to ft h et h r e s h o l dt a k e s
place in its proximity, while that coming from smaller ﬁrms is likely to be
very small.
We have performed several robustness checks. We have experimented
with diﬀerent values of δ,t h et h r e s h o l de ﬀects. We found that the increase
in average size grows less than proportionally with it: for example, a δ =4 %
in the baseline experiment brings about an increase in average size of 0.9%,
against the 0.5 of the basic experiment with δ =2 % . This implies that, even
if we had substantially underestimated the threshold eﬀect, the size increase
is bound to remain modest. We have also controlled that the particular
size class subdivision chosen does not inﬂuence results. We have repeated
the experiment for a ﬁner class subdivision, designed so that each size class
contains approximately 3% of total employment (the approximate share of
size classes deﬁned over one employee) and composed of 32 classes, obtaining
slightly smaller eﬀects.
We have seen that another empirically relevant threshold occurs at 35.
We perform the experiment of removing that threshold, again using the two
redistributive assumptions above and, from the estimates in the previous
section, taking 2% as the reduction in the growth probability induced by
the threshold. Again, we ﬁnd that the increase in the long-run average ﬁrm
size is below 1%, a further indication that the threshold eﬀects induced by
E P Le x p l a i nv e r yl i t t l eo ft h eI t a l i a na n o m a l y .
6 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed one of the possible causes of the small average size
of Italian ﬁrms, i.e. EPL. We have exploited the fact that EPL applies dif-
ferentially to ﬁrms of diﬀerent size, which has some clear-cut implications
for ﬁrm dynamics. Our results show that EPL does inﬂuence ﬁrm dynamics,
but that its eﬀects are quantitatively rather modest: in most of our experi-
ments, average ﬁrm size increases by less than 1% when removing the eﬀect
of EPL.
Two important qualiﬁcations should be kept in mind. First, we only
identify the eﬀects due to the fact that EPL threshold discourages small
ﬁrms from growing, ignoring the potential eﬀects of EPL on ﬁrms already
above the threshold. Second, our analysis is partial equilibrium and refers
21to ﬁrm size distribution, and has nothing to say about employment: the
increase in average ﬁrm size should not automatically be taken to imply a
similar increase in employment. In fact, the response of employment will
depend on many factors not included in this analysis, such as the impact on
wages, the eﬀects of larger average size on entry at the lower end of the size
distribution and so on.
In terms of policy, our results imply that, while EPL does play a role, it
is probably not the most important factor in explaining the Italian anomaly.
Moreover, the small eﬀects we ﬁnd imply that we should not expect legisla-
tion changes to have a large impact on ﬁrm size, either if they extend the
more stringent EPL to ﬁrms below the 15 - e m p l o y e et h r e s h o l do ri ft h e yr e l a x
that of ﬁrms above it. This does not mean that changes in the legislation
might not have other important eﬀects, possibly on productivity growth,
reallocation and accumulation; but if the aim is to increase ﬁrm size, then
our results suggest that the eﬀort might be more fruitful elsewhere. The
question of where remains unanswered.
22A Appendixes
A.1 The diﬃculty of assessing employment protection tight-
ness through international comparisons: the OECD in-
dex
International comparisons can help us understand how restrictive EPL is in
any single country. Unfortunately, international comparisons of institutional
arrangements are not easy and the existing attempts do not seem to be fully
satisfactory.
The most inﬂuential comparative study is that conducted by the OECD,
which collected detailed information on individual and collective dismissals
for most member countries (OECD 1999). The OECD study tried to eval-
uate how restrictive is the deﬁnition of fair dismissal and how cumbersome
are the procedures to ﬁre workers. Moreover, the OECD assessed the cost
of ﬁr i n gaw o r k e r ,b o t hi nt h ec a s eo fan o - f a u l td i s m i s s a la n di nt h ec a s eo f
an unfair one. This body of information was then summarized in a numer-
ical index, ranking the OECD countries according to the tightness of their
legislation. The OECD study explicitly skipped the diﬃculty of assessing
the actual application of the rules by courts, limiting the analysis to the
comparison of legislations. Moreover, to make comparisons feasible, some
base-line assumptions, for instance on the duration of trials, were made.
The OECD index has been criticized on the grounds that apparently
similar rules can have very diﬀerent interpretations across countries and
that the same rules can have diﬀerent eﬀects according to the eﬃciency of
the judiciary system, so that this indicator is of little use for the policy-
maker (Bertola et al. 2000). Moreover, even disregarding these criticisms
the OECD index computed for Italy appears to be aﬀected by some misun-
derstandings of Italian legislation.
The OECD index is a weighted average of scores assigned to diﬀerent as-
pects of national employment regulation. As to the indicator of the strictness
of employment protection for regular employment, the OECD analysts took
into account the following issues: the procedures; the delay to start of notice;
the notice period for workers with 9 months, 4 years and 20 years of tenure;
the severance payment for no-fault individual dismissal for the same tenures;
the deﬁnition of unfair dismissal; the trial period before eligibility for full
protection; unfair dismissal compensation at 20 years of tenure; the extent
of reinstatement. The index computed for Italy erroneously considered as
a ﬁring cost a special kind of severance payment, the TFR (Trattamento di
ﬁne rapporto), which can be regarded as a sort of deferred salary: this is a
23one-oﬀ payment of the sum put aside during the worker’s permanence in the
ﬁrm (0.07 of his yearly income for each year of work), which is at the ﬁrm’s
disposal while the worker maintains his job. Italian workers are entitled to
this payment irrespective of the reasons for separation, even in the case of
retirement or resignation. In companies with a private pension fund, the
TFR contributes to its funding. Thus, it is a part of workers’ compensation
and is not related to ﬁring. Removing the TFR from ﬁring costs changes
Italy’s ranking dramatically, from ﬁfth to eighteenth position, close to that
of Anglo-Saxon countries.
Moving to the regulation of collective dismissals, we ﬁnd the interpre-
tation that OECD analysts gave to Italian rules questionable. Given that
collective dismissals require more burdensome procedures, they valued the
employment regulation of a country to be more restrictive, the lower the
threshold for applying the collective dismissal procedure. In the Italian
case, as we said above, this threshold is set at 5 workers, which is quite low
compared to most OECD countries. Therefore, taking the OECD score at
face value, Italian regulation would become less restrictive by raising this
threshold to a higher level. This conclusion, however, is probably incorrect
considering together the rules and their enforcement. On the basis of our
earlier remarks, it is plausible that collective dismissal procedure reduces the
uncertainty about the result of a dismissal, so that it could be advantageous
for Italian ﬁrms to make use of collective dismissals even with the additional
burdens. In that case, all things being equal, it would be better to maintain
a low threshold. These considerations are just an example of the kind of
diﬃculty we face when we do not take account of both the rules and their
actual application, and they shed further doubts on the possibility of using
the OECD index to orient policy making (Bertola et al. 2000).
A.2 The transition matrix
This simple model is based on the Markovian structure of the productivity
shocks and therefore of size: size today is a suﬃcient statistics to determine
the size distribution tomorrow. This, of course, is a strong assumption, and
in reality other elements aﬀect the evolution of size at the ﬁrm level. In
the aggregate, however, the individual factors will tend to cancel out and
this structure is likely to be a good approximation of the evolution of ﬁrm
size distribution. Equally importantly, the Markovian structure allows for
a very general representation of the size distribution in terms of Markov
transition matrices, which do not require any parametric assumption about
24the distribution of ﬁrm size. To determine the Markov transition matrix we
need to split the size distribution into some classes and then to calculate
the probability of going from any class to any other. From our data, we
calculate the stochastic transition matrix P, i.e. a (n + 1,n+ 1) matrix
where pij is the probability of going from class j to class i.T h ee n t r i e so f
P sum to one by column:
 
i pij = 1.
The only problematic aspect is how we treat entry and exit. For year t,
deﬁne Xt as the n+1 column vector representing the share of ﬁrms in each
class. The element xn+1 is the share of entrants between t and t+1. Then,
the last column of P is the share of entrants that end up in each class. The
last row of P represents exit, and pn+1n+1 =0 , which excludes the case of
entrants that immediately exit. The dynamic system has the form
Xt+1 = PXt (20)
where, at each step, one needs to enter the share of entrants between t and
t+1 to track down the actual evolution of X. In steady state, however, the
share of entrants must be equal to that of exiters.
AS T MP is said to be regular if, when raised to some power k,i th a s
the property that all its elements are strictly positive. In this case, there
exists a unique long-run limiting distribution (Karlin & Taylor 1975) which
c a nb ec o m p u t e da sf o l l o w . I ns t e a d ys t a t e ,Xt+1 = Xt so that from (20)
we get a system of n + 1 equations in n + 1 unknowns
(I − P)X =0 (21)
Given that
 
i pij = 1, one equation is linearly dependent on the others. We
use the additional equation
 
i xi = 1,w i t hw h i c hw ec a ns o l v ef o rt h en+1
unknowns. The resulting vector is the steady-state distribution of ﬁrms in
the classes, which can be compared with the actual one.
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27Table 1: Probit model. Probability of growth, by sector and area
Total Man. Serv. N-W N-E C S
Size 4.89∗∗∗
(0.34)
4.12∗∗∗
(0.54)
6.20∗∗∗
(0.53)
4.93∗∗∗
(0.90)
1.58
(1.03)
4.70∗∗∗
(1.21)
6.28∗∗∗
(1.33)
Size^2 −0.37∗∗∗
(0.04)
−0.26∗∗∗
(0.07)
−0.52∗∗∗
(0.06)
−0.36∗∗∗
(0.11)
0.09
(0.12)
−0.35∗∗∗
(0.15)
−0.58∗∗∗
(0.17)
Size^3 0.01∗∗∗
(0.02)
0.01
(0.00)
∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗
(0.01)
−0.013∗∗
(0.01)
0.01
(0.1)
0.02∗∗∗
(0.01)
Size^4 −0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
−0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
−0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.00
(0.00)
0.00∗∗
(0.00)
Age −0.78∗∗∗
(0.01)
−.97∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.74∗∗∗
(0.01)
−0.92∗∗∗
(0.03)
−1.05∗∗∗
(0.03)
−0.86∗∗∗
(0.03)
−0.96∗∗∗
(0.03)
Age^2 0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
0.01∗∗∗
(0.00)
Du13 0.07
(0.14)
.06
(0.22)
0.11
(0.24)
0.14
(0.38)
−0.44
(0.41)
0.57
(0.49)
−0.07
(0.56)
Du14 −0.35∗∗
(0.15)
.22
(.23)
−0.96∗∗∗
(0.25)
−0.45
(0.38)
0.35
(0.43)
−0.04
(0.53)
0.39
(0.60)
Du15 −1.51∗∗∗
(0.16)
−1.78∗∗∗
(−1.78)
−1.76∗∗∗
(0.27)
−1.98∗∗∗
(0.39)
−1.51∗∗∗
(0.44)
−2.42∗∗∗
(0.53)
−0.91
(0.63)
Pseudo Rsq 1.64 1.89 1.54 2.08 1.9 1.54 1.64
N. obs 3,263,287 1,397,795 1,362,775 508,064 397,976 276,271 215,484
Note: Probit estimates. The table reports the change in probability for an inﬁnites-
imal change in each independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the
probability for dummy variables. Sector, year and regional dummies were included
in the model.
Firms in the range 5 - 25 workers. ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and
∗10%.
28T a b l e2 :S i z ed u m m ye s t i m a t e s
Probability of increasing by: Size dummy Parameter
dy/dx
1 or more 15 1.51∗∗∗
(0.16)
2o rm o r e 140 .79∗∗∗
(0.13)
3o rm o r e 130 .39∗∗∗
(0.09)
4o rm o r e 120 .36∗∗∗
(0.06)
5o rm o r e 11 0.24∗∗∗
(0.05)
6o rm o r e 100 .11∗∗∗
(0.04)
7o rm o r e 90 .10∗∗∗
(0.02)
8o rm o r e 40 .06∗∗∗
(0.02)
Note: Each row refers to a diﬀerent probit model. The ﬁrst reports the estimate
of the dummy at 15 for the probability of growing by one or more, the second the
estimate of dummy 14 for the probability of growing by 2 or more etc. The table
reports the discrete change in probability due to these dummies. Sector, year and
regional dummies were included in the models. ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗
at 5% and ∗ 10%. We used a fourth-degree polynomial in size for rows 1 and 2,
a third-degree polynomial for row 3 and a second-degree polynomial in size in the
other probits, to accommodate the diﬀerent relations between these probabilities
and size which is apparent from Fig. 8 .
29Table 3: Probit model. Probability of growth
Variables Parameter
dy/dx
Size 2.51∗∗∗
(0.43)
Size^2 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01)
Size^3 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
Age 0.44∗∗∗
(0.02)
Age^2 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
Du34 −0.96∗∗
(0.39)
Du35 −1.86∗∗∗
(0.41)
Note: The table reports the change in probability for an inﬁnitesimal change in
each independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability
for dummy variables. Sector, year and regional dummies were included in the
model. ∗∗∗ indicate signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5% and ∗ 10%. Firms in the range
20-50 workers. Number of observations: 539,191; Pseudo Rsq=1.71
30Table 4: Transition matrix
1 2 3 4 5 7 9 12 15 20 24 29 35 49 99 249 499 500+ entry
1 74.5 20.5 7.8 4.4 3.1 2.5 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.7 1.0 60.3
2 8.8 52.6 18.6 6.8 3.3 1.8 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 15.6
3 2.0 12.4 44.7 18.7 7.4 3.1 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 7.4
4 0.7 3.2 13.8 39.3 18.4 6.1 2.1 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 4.1
5 0.3 1.1 4.2 14.6 35.1 13.6 3.4 1.4 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.6
7 0.3 0.7 2.3 7.3 21.1 46.6 19.5 5.2 2.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 3.1
9 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.5 3.8 15.1 41.7 16.0 3.7 1.6 0.8 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.8
12 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.7 1.4 4.3 19.1 47.8 19.1 4.7 1.9 1.1 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.7
15 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 3.1 15.8 45.5 15.4 3.4 1.7 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.0
20 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.2 3.8 18.3 52.5 20.8 5.6 2.3 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.9
24 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 2.0 12.6 42.3 16.5 3.8 1.5 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4
29 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.8 3.1 17.7 45.0 15.9 3.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3
35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.0 3.9 17.8 49.4 12.6 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2
49 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.6 4.4 18.9 60.7 8.4 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3
99 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 1.0 2.1 13.6 77.4 7.8 0.4 0.2 0.3
249 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 5.3 83.3 8.3 0.5 0.1
499 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.1 81.6 4.2 0.0
500+ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 4.6 90.0 0.0
exit 12.9 8.8 7.1 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.5 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.2 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.2 3.6 0.0
Each entry represents the probability of moving from the size class of the column to that of the row. Size classes are identiﬁed with the upper limit
of the class. so that. for example, the class 20 consists of ﬁrms in the size interval 16-20. Boldface entries represent the persistance probability.
Average values for the 1986-98 period.Table 5: Firm size distribution (actual and stready-state) and average size
within each class
Size class Actual sh. Ss sh. Diﬀerence µj
1 41.00 39.62 1.38 0.85
2 15.90 15.61 0.29 2.00
3 9.46 9.37 0.09 3.00
46 . 176 . 18- 0 . 0 1 4.00
5 4.34 4.40 -0.06 5.00
7 5.77 5.92 -0.156 . 4 4
9 3.72 3.85 -0.138 . 4 5
12 3.64 3.83 -0.18 10.89
15 2.39 2.56 -0.18 13.91
20 2.19 2.43 -0.24 17.74
24 1.02 1.16- 0 . 14 22.37
29 0.86 0.99 -0.13 26.86
35 0.76 0.88 -0.12 32.34
49 0.87 1.03 -0.164 1.59
99 1.06 1.25 -0.196 8 . 5 1
249 0.54 0.61 -0.08 150.60
499 0.160 . 17 -0.00 346.49
500+ 0.140 . 130 . 0 11 800.77
The ﬁrst column is the size class, the second the share calculated from the data,
the third the implied steady state share, the fourth the diﬀerence between the two,
and the last the average ﬁrm size within class.
32Table 6: Percentage increase in average ﬁrm size and in the share of ﬁrms
above the 15 emp. threshold in steady-state
Experiment Outcome by reallocation method
Next Proportional
Classes δ Mean % >15 Mean %. >15
Baseline case: size class 13-15
13+ 2 .5 .16. 7. 18
Other classes: experiment A (actual estimates)
10+ .36 .62 .211 .1 .24
8+ .10. 6 5 . 2 2 1.2 .26
Other classes: experiment B (proportional changes)
10+ .72 .75 .25 1.3 .3
8+ .14. 8 0 . 2 7 1.5 .32
6+ .05 .82 .28 1.6 .34
5+ .02 .83 .28 1.6 .34
4+ .01 .84 .28 1.7 .35
1+ .003 .86 .29 1.8 .36
Note: Jump is the decrease in the probability of inaction; Next cell means that
the reduction in inaction is compensated by an identical increase in the probability
of moving to the next size class, Proportional by an increase in all superior size
classes, in proportion to the actual probability of moving to each of them; the
outcome columns report the percentage increase in steady-state average size and
the percentage points increase in share of ﬁrms above 15 and 35 employees.
33Figure 1: Firm and employment shares by size class (Average values over
the 1986-98 period)
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34Figure 3: Probability of growth by size class, average 1986-1997
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Figure 4: Probability of growth by size class in the service and manufactur-
ing sectors
0.25
0.26
0.27
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.31
0.32
0.33
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.40
0.41
0.42
56789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 3 2 4 2 5
Services
Manufacturing
35Figure 5: Probability of growth and predicted probabilities, all sectors
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Figure 6: Probability of growth and predicted probability, manufacturing
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36Figure 7: Probability of growth and predicted probability, services
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37Figure 8: Probability of growing by size of the increase (1 or more, 2 or
more, etc.) and ﬁrm size
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38Figure 9: Probability of growing by size of the increase and ﬁrm size
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39Figure 10: Inertia probability by ﬁrm size
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